Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1986

Madsen v. Prudential Federal Savings & Loan
Assoiation : Unknown
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert J. DeBry; Robert J. Debry & Associates; Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Joseph J. Palmer; Reid E. Lewis; Moyle & Draper; Attorneys for Defendants.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Madsen v. Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Assoiation, No. 860148.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/991

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

BRIEF
5CUMENT
LAW

P U
, # 9ARDIN A WH.TNEY

OFFICES OF

MOYLE

Q
HORSLEY ^
Q JJ O
OH
HN
N W.
W. HORSLEY^

^ ^

^

A

&

D R A P E R

PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
6 0 0 D E S E R E T PLAZA

YOUNG 5. MOYLE (1892-193-4)
MOYLE & MOYLE U 9 3 4 - I 9 7 I )

NO. 15 EAST FIRST SOUTH
ROYAL E |. L HANSEN

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8-4IM-I9I5

H. O^^ERCEY
JEFFREY

TELECOPIER ceoi> 5Z.-©o.5

TELEPHONE (SOD 5 2 - 0 2 5 0

ROBINSON

July

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk
Utah Supreme Court
322
322 State
State Capitol
Capitol Buildin
Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Re:

7, 1988

UK ,7 -jqnn
* ^0D
_ _ _ _ _
JUL

Madsen v. Prudential
Case No. 860148

Dear Mr. Butler:
This letter (and nine copies) is submitted on behalf
of Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association under Rule
24(j) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. Please bring the
letter to the attention of the Court.
The recent case of Lilieberq v. Health Services
Acquisition Corp.,
U.S.
, 56 U.S.L.W. 4637 (U.S. June
17, 1988) (No. 86-957) is additional authority for five
arguments made by Prudential in the Brief of Respondent and in
the Supplemental Brief of Respondent. Each is discussed
below. A copy of Lilieberq is enclosed.
First, Lilieberq holds a judge must be disqualified in
any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned. Id. at 4641-4642. This supports Point III A (at
22-27) in the Brief of Respondent.
Second, Lilieberq holds disqualification for
appearance of bias relates back and renders void the
discretionary judicial acts taken by the trial judge. If a
judgment was entered, it is vacated and a new trial granted,
especially when the opposing party has not made a showing of
"special hardship" by reason of his or her reliance on the
original judgment. Id. at 4641-4642, 4643. This supports
Point VI B (at 48-50) in the Brief of Respondent and Point II
(at 3-4) in the Supplemental Brief of Respondent.
Third, in reaching its decision in Lilieberq, the
Supreme Court deferred to the findings made by the lower
courts, both on the issue of bias and on the selection of the
appropriate remedy (vacation of the judgment) to correct the
problem. Id. at 4641-4642. This supports Point I (at 12) in
the Brief of Respondent and Point I (at 1-3) in the
Supplemental Brief of Respondent.
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Fourth, the op inion supports Prudential's argument
that a judge must be di squalified if he has any financial
interest in the outcome of the case. See Point III B (at
28-29) in the Brief of Respondent, and Point III (at 5-7) in
the Supplemental Brief of Respondent. The Supreme Court noted
that disqualification i s warranted "no matter how insubstantial
the financial interest and regardless of whether or not the
interest actually creat es an appearance of impropriety." Id.
at 4641, N. 8.
Fifth, the Court noted that one of its prior
decisions, Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813
(1986), is best understood as a description of the
constitutional dimensions of disqualification, because of
appearance of bias, under the Due Process Clause, id. at 4642,
N. 12. That supports Point III B (at 30) in the Brief of
Respondent.
Very truly yours,
MOYLE ^DRAPER, P.C.

cULw^—-—.
x

oseprr j. Palmer
Attorneys for Prudential
Federal Savings & Loan
Association
cc:

Robert J. Debry, of
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Appellants
Peter W. Billings, of
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
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from the interpretation of § 514 that the Court rejects, is not
would be subject to suit under certain circumstances. The
lightly to be inferred. Nevertheless, I believe there are two
majority notes, correctly, that civil enforcement actions are
maintainable pursuant to 29 U. S. C. § 1132. The majority reasons why this consideration is not weighty in the present
context.
points further to certain suits that may be brought "against
ERISA plans for run-of-the-mill state-law claims . . . ."
First, the alternative construction adopted by the Court
Ante, at 6-7. The Court reasons that, as ERISA does not
results in the total redundancy of § 514(b)(7), 29 U. S. C.
provide an enforcement mechanism for collecting judgments
§ 1144(b)(7) (1982 ed., Supp. III). It is preferable, in my
won in such suits, Congress must have intended that stateview, to tolerate the partial overlap rejected by the Court
law methods of collection remain undisturbed.
than to construe § 514 so as to render another section of the
This argument has no relevance to the issue before us.
statute surplus in its entirety. Second, the deliberate, exThe question we face is not whether garnishment may be
pansive reach of § 514 necessarily encompasses many state
used to enforce a valid judgment obtained against an ERISA
laws that would be pre-empted even in the absence of its
plan. When garnishment is so used, its process issues
broad mandate, solely on the basis of their conflict with
against some third party who owes the plan a debt or who has ERISA's substantive requirements. Some degree of overlap
property in his possession in which the plan has an interest.
is a necessary concomitant of the approach to pre-emption
The significant burdens of complying with the garnishment
chosen by Congress. The partial redundancy which the
order fall on the plan's debtor, not on the plan. The issue we
Court strives to avoid is essentially analogous to a host of
•face in this case is quite different: it is whether an ERISA
like overlaps that Congress must have foreseen. To suggest
benefit plan may be forced to act as a garnishee by creditors that this type of overlap is sufficient to call into question the
of the plan's participants and beneficiaries. Because the
applicability of § 514 is to defeat the very purpose for which
Court fails to analyze the different contexts in which state
it was enacted. I cannot agree with the Court's conclusion
garnishment laws may affect ERISA plans, its conclusion
that petitioners must comply with the garnishment orders at
that such laws are never pre-empted is far too broad. And
issue in this case.
while the Court's conclusion may be valid in garnishment proERNEST L. MATHEWS JR., New York, N.Y. (THOMAS W.
ceedings where an ERISA plan is the debtor, it is plainly unGLEASON, FARRINGTON & ABBOTT, P C , CHARLES R.
warranted in situations where, as here, the plan is a garGOLDBURG, and KEVIN MARRINAN, on the briefs) for petitionnishee. For it is in the latter situation that plans face the
ers; BRIAN J. MARTIN, Assistant to the Solicitor General
repetitious and costly burden of monitoring controversies in(CHARLES FRIED, Sol. Gen., DONALD B. AYER, Dpt>. Sol.
Gen., CHRISTOPHER J. WRIGHT, Asst. to the Sol. Gen.,
volving hundreds of beneficiaries and participants in various
GEORGE R. SALEM, Sol. of Labor, ALLEN H. FELDMAN,
states.
Assoc. Sol., CAROL A. DE DEO, Dpty. Assoc. Sol., and BETTE J.
Further, it assumes the point in issue to say that the
BRIGGS, Labor Dept. atty., on the briefs) for U.S. as amicus curiae;
Court's conclusion is required by cases holding that a "sueMAUREEN E. MAHONEY, Washington, D.C. (LATHAM &
w
WATKINS, on the briefs) as amicus curiae, in support of the judgand-be-sued clause creates a presumption of susceptibility to
ment below.
garnishment and other state-law procedures for enforcing
judgments. See ante, at 8, n. 9, citing Franchise Tax Board
of California v. USPS, 467 U. S. 512 (1984), and FHA v.
Burr, 309 U. S. 242 (1940). The sue-and-be-sued clause in
No. 86-957
each of those cases was a waiver of the sovereign immunity
that otherwise would have protected certain federal agencies
from legal process, including writs of garnishment. In that JOHN A. LILJEBERG, JR., PETITIONER v. HEALTH
SERVICES ACQUISITION CORP.
context, it was perfectly sensible to "presum[e] that when
Congress launched a governmental agency into the commerON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
cial world and endowed it with authority to 'sue or be sued,'
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
that agency is no less amenable to judicial process that a priSyllabus
vate enterprise under like circumstances would be." FHA
v. Burr, supra, at 245. In the ERISA context, by contrast,
No. 86-957. Argued December 9, 1987-Reargued April 25, 1988§514 substantively limits the States' ability to treat employee
Decided June 17, 1988
benefit plans as they may treat any commercial enterprise.
In 1977, pursuant to a plan to construct and operate a hospital in Kenner,
Our cases finding several state-law causes of action preLouisiana, petitioner formed a corporation (St. Jude) to apply for the
empted establish at least this much. See, e. g., Pilot Life,
necessary state "certificate of need.*' During the next two years peti481 U. S., at
(holding that certain contract and tort
tioner negotiated with Loyola University over a proposal to purchase as
the hospital site a portion of Loyola's Kenner land for several million
laws, though otherwise generally applicable, may not be indollars, coupled with a plan to rezone Loyola's adjoining land to greatly
voked against an employee benefit plan); Shaw, 463 U. S., at
increase its value. Federal District Court Judge Robert Collins was a
103-106 (finding certain fair employment laws pre-empted).
member, and regularly attended the meetings, of Loyola's Board of
The second argument on which the Court relies is that the
Trustees, whose minutes indicated regular discussions of the negotiaconclusion that §514 preempts the state statutes at issue in
tions' progress and reflected the fact that Loyola's interest in the project
was dependent on the issuance of the certificate. Petitioner also conthis case would render redundant the bar against alienation
ducted negotiations with respondent's corporate predecessor (HAD, culor assignment of pension benefits set forth in ERISA
minating in HAI's purchase of a Kenner site not owned by Loyola and its
§206(d)(l), 29 U. S. C. § 1056(d)(1). See ante, at 11. This
filing of the certificate application upon petitioner's execution of an
provision prohibits any assignment, whether voluntary or inagreement which HAI believed gave it title to St. Jude. After the cervoluntary, of pension plan assets. Under the view the Court
tificate was issued in St. Jude's name, and a dispute between petitioner
and HAI arose as to St. Jude's ownership, petitioner's proposal to rerejects, § 514(a) would prohibit involuntary assignments of
open the Loyola negotiations was discussed and formally approved at the
pension and welfare plan assets because such assignments
Board's meeting on November 12, 1981, which Judge Collins attended.
necessarily would be effected by application of state laws,
On November 30, 1981, respondentfiledsuit in the District Court seeklike the Georgia laws at issue in this case, that are preing a declaration of ownership of St. Jude. Judge Collins, sitting withempted. I agree with the Court that ordinarily the partial
out a jury, tried the case on January 21 and 22, 1982, immediately announcing his intention to rule for petitioner. On January 28, 1982, at a
—J—J—„„r ^ Q atotntnrv command, such as would result
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meeting which Judge Collins did not attend, the Loyola Board discussed
the terms of an agreement of sale with petitioner, which provided, inter
alia, that it would be void if petitioner failed to satisfy certain conditions,
the fulfillment of which depended on hisretentionof control over the certificate. Judge Collins did not read the minutes of that meeting until
March 24, 1982. In the meantime, on March 16, he entered judgment
for petitioner, crediting petitioner's version of crucial, disputed conversations. Ten months after the Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment, respondent, having just learned that Judge Collins was associated
with Loyola while petitioner and the University were engaged in negotiations concerning the hospital site, moved pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) to vacate the judgment on the ground that
Judge Collins was disqualified under 28 U. S. C. § 455. Judge Collins
denied the motion, but the Court of Appealsreversedandremandedto a
different judge, who also denied the motion on the ground that, although
the evidence gave rise to an appearance of impropriety, Judge Collins
lacked actual knowledge of Loyola's interest in the litigation during the
trial and prior to thefilingof the judgment. The Court of Appeals again
reversed, ruling that the appearance of impropriety is a sufficient
ground for disqualification under § 455(a). Moreover, the court ruled
that vacatur was an appropriate remedy in these circumstances.
Held:
•1. A violation of § 455(a)—whichrequiresa judge to disqualify himself
in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned—is established when areasonableperson, knowing the relevant
facts, would expect that a judge knew of circumstances creating an appearance of partiality, notwithstanding afindingthat the judge was not
actually conscious of those circumstances. Torequirescienter as an element of a § 455(a) violation would contravene that section's language and
its purpose of promoting public confidence in the integrity of the judicial
system. Thisreadingof § 455(a) does not require judges to perform the
impossible by disqualifying themselves based on facts they do not know,
since, in proper cases, the provision can be applied retroactively to rectify an oversight once the judge concludes that "his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned." Here, where both lower courts found an
ample basis in therecordfor concluding that an objective observer would
have questioned Judge Collins' impartiality, his failure to disqualify himself was a plain violation of § 455(a) even though it was initially the product of a temporary lapse of memory.
2. Vacatur was a proper remedy for the § 455(a) violation in the circumstances of this case. In determining whether a § 455 violation requires vacatur under Rule 60(b)(6)—which gives federal courts broad authority to grant relief from a final judgment "upon such terms as are
just," provided that the motion is made within areasonabletime—it is
appropriate to consider the risk of injustice to the particular parties, the
risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in other cases, and the
risk of undermining the public's confidence in the judicial process.
Here, despite his lack of actual knowledge of Loyola's interest in the dispute during trial, Judge Collins' participation in the case created a strong
appearance of impropriety, particularly in light of his regular attendance
at Board meetings, including the one on November 12, 1982, and the financial importance of the project to Loyola; his failure to attend the January 28, 1982, meeting or to read the minutes of that meeting before entering judgment; his inexcusable failure to recuse himself or disclose his
interest on March 24, 1982, whenrespondentstill had time to file a newtrial motion or to use the failure as an issue on direct appeal; and his failure to acknowledge, in denying the motion to vacate, that he had known
about Loyola's interest both shortly before and shortly after trial, or to
indicate any awareness of a duty to recuse himself in March 1982.
Moreover, vacatur here will not produce injustice in other such cases,
and may, in fact, prompt other judges to more carefully search for and
disclose disqualification grounds. Furthermore, a careful study of the
merits of the underlying litigation suggests that there is a greater risk of
unfairness in upholding the judgment for petitioner than in allowing a
new trial, while neither petitioner nor Loyola has made a showing of special hardship by reason of their reliance on the original judgment. Finally, although a 10-month delay would normally foreclose vacatur based
on a 5 455(a) violation, the delay here is excusable since it is entirely
attributable to Judge Collins' conduct.
796 F. 2d 796, affirmed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN,
MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined.

REHNQUIST, C. J.,

filed a dissenting opinion, in which WHITE and SC\LIA, JJ., joined.
O'CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
JUSTICE STEVENS

delivered the opinion of the Court.
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Stat. 1609. The first sentence of the amendment provides:
"Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States
shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U. S. C.
§ 455(a) as amended.
In the present case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that a violation of § 455(a) is established when
a reasonable person, knowing the relevant facts, would expect that a justice, judge, or magistrate knew of circumstances creating an appearance of partiality, notwithstanding
a finding that the judge was not actually eonscious of those
circumstances. Moreover, although the judgment in question had become final, the Court of Appeals determined that
under the facts of this case, the appropriate remedy was to
vacate the court's judgment. We granted certiorari to consider its construction of § 455(a) as well as its remedial decision. 480 U. S.
. We now affirm.
I
In November 1981, respondent Health Services Acquisition Corp. brought an action against petitioner John Liljeberg, Jr., seeking a declaration of ownership of a corporation
known as St. Jude Hospital of Kenner, Louisiana (St. Jude).
The case was tried by Judge Robert Collins, sitting without a
jury. Judge Collins found for Liljeberg and, over a strong
dissent, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Approximately 10
months later, respondent learned that Judge Collins had been
a member of the Board of Trustees of Loyola University
while Liljeberg was negotiating with Loyola to purchase a
parcel of land on which to construct a hospital. The success
and benefit to Loyola of these negotiations turned, in large
part, on Liljeberg prevailing in the litigation before Judge
Collins.
Based on this information, respondent moved pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) to vacate the judgment on the ground that Judge Collins was disqualified under
§455 at the time he heard the action and entered judgment in
favor of Liljeberg. Judge Collins denied the motion and respondent appealed. The Court of Appeals determined that
resolution of the motion required factual findings concerning
the extent and timing of Judge Collins, knowledge of Loyola's
interest in the declaratory relief litigation. Accordingly, the
panel reversed and remanded the matter to a different judge
for such findings. App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a. On remand,
the District Court found that based on his attendance at
Board meetings Judge Collins had actual knowledge of Loyola's interest in St. Jude in 1980 and 1981. The court further
concluded, however, that Judge Collins had forgotten about
Loyola's interest by the time the declaratory judgment suit
came to trial in January 1982. On March 24, 1982, Judge
Collins reviewed materials sent to him by the Board to prepare for an upcoming meeting. At that time—just a few
days after he had filed his opinion finding for Liljeberg and
still within the 10-day period allowed for filing a motion for a
new trial—Judge Collins once again obtained actual knowledge of Loyola's interest in St. Jude. Finally, the District
Court found that although Judge Collins thus lacked actual
knowledge during trial and prior to the filing of his opinion,
the evidence nonetheless gave rise to an appearance of impropriety. However, reading the Court of Appeals' mandate as limited to the issue of actual knowledge, the District
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The Court of Appeals again reversed. The court first
noted that Judge Collins should have immediately disqualified himself when his actual knowledge of Loyola's interest
was renewed.1 The court also found that regardless of
Judge Collins' actual knowledge, "a reasonable observer
would expect that Judge Collins would remember that Loyola
had some dealings with Liljeberg and St. Jude and seek to
ascertain the nature of these dealings." 796 F. 2d 7%,
803 (1986). Such an appearance of impropriety, in the view
of the Court of Appeals, was sufficient ground for disqualification under § 455(a). Although recognizing that caution
is required in determining whether a judgment should be vacated after becoming final, the court concluded that since
the appearance of partiality was convincingly established and
since the motion to vacate wasfiledas promptly as possible,
the appropriate remedy was to vacate the declaratory relief
judgment. Because the issues presented largely turn on the
facts as they give rise to an appearance of impropriety, it
is necessary to relate the sequence and substance of these
events in some detail.
II
Petitioner, John Liljeberg, Jr., is a pharmacist, a promoter, and a half-owner of Axel Realty, Inc., a real estate
brokerage firm. In 1976, he became interested in a project
to construct and operate a hospital in Kenner, Louisiana, a
suburb of New Orleans. In addition to providing the community with needed health care facilities, he hoped to obtain
a real estate commission for Axel Realty and the exclusive
right to provide pharmaceutical services at the new hospital.
The successful operation of such a hospital depended upon
the acquisition of a "certificate of need" from the State of
Louisiana; without such a certificate the hospital would not
qualify for health care reimbursement payments under the
federal medicare and medicaid programs.2 Accordingly, in
October 1979, Liljeberg formed St. Jude, intending to have
the corporation apply for the certificate of need at an appropriate time.
During the next two years Liljeberg engaged in serious
negotiations with at least two major parties. One set of
negotiations involved a proposal to purchase a large tract of
land from Loyola University for use as a hospital site, coupled with a plan to rezone adjoining University property.
The proposed benefits to the University included not only the
proceeds of the real estate sale itself, amounting to several
million dollars, but also a substantial increase in the value to
the University of the rezoned adjoining property. The progress of these negotiations was regularly reported to the University's Board of Trustees by its Real Estate Committee
and discussed at Board meetings. The minutes of those
meetings indicate that the University's interest in the project
was dependent on the issuance of the certificate of need.8
1

Because the court concluded that the judgment should be vacated
based on an appearance of impropriety that permeated the entire proceeding, it declined to decide on the appropriate remedy for a judge's failure to
promptly disqualify himself after the entry of judgment but prior to expiration of the time allowed for filing certain motions.
•See 42 U. S. C. §1320a-l (1982 ed., and Supp. III). As the Court
of Appeals noted, "(without reimbursement, it is impractical (if not impossible) to operate a hospital." App. to Pet. for Cert. 58a, n. 1.
•The District Court found:
"Discussions of the St. Jude Hospital project are reflected in the minutes
of the next meeting of the Board of Trustees on January 24, 1980, which
Judge Collins attended. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 22. Lu>berg's first offer
on behalf of St. Jude Properties to purchase approximately 75 acres of Loyola's Kenner property was presented in a Real Estate Committee report,
which was summarized in the Board minutes. The minutes also include
the response of Loyola University to LUjeberg, including the Committee's
expression of interest in continuing negotiations with St. Jude Properties.
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Liljeberg was also conducting serious negotiations with respondent's corporate predecessor, Hospital Affiliates International (HAD, a national health management company.
In the summer of 1980, Liljeberg and HAI reached an agreement in principle, outlining their respective roles in developing the hospital. The agreement contemplated that
HAI would purchase a tract of land in Kenner (not owned by
the University) and construct the hospital on that land; prepare and file the certificate of need; and retain Liljeberg as
a consultant to the hospital in various capacities. In turn, it
was understood that Liljeberg would transfer St. Jude to
HAI. Pursuant to this preliminary agreement, various documents were executed, including an agreement by HAI to
purchase the tract of land from its owner for five million
dollars and a further agreement by HAI to place $500,000 in
escrow. In addition, it was agreed that Axel Realty, Inc.,
would receive a $250,000 commission for locating the property. Eventually, Liljeberg signed a "warranty and indemnity agreement," which HAI understood to transfer ownership of St. Jude to HAI. After the warranty and indemnity
agreement was signed, HAI filed an application for the certificate of need.
On August 26,1981, the certificate of need was issued and
delivered to Liljeberg. He promptly advised HAI4 and
HAI paid the real estate commission to Axel Realty. A dispute arose, however, over whether the warranty and indemnity agreement did in feet transfer ownership of St, Jude
to HAI. Liljeberg contended that the transfer of ownership
of St. Jude—and hence, the certificate of need—was conditioned upon reaching afinalagreement concerning his continued participation in the hospital project. This contention
was not supported by any written instrument. HAI denied
that there was any such unwritten understanding and insisted that, by virtue of the warranty and indemnity agreement, it had been sole owner of St. Jude for over a year.
The dispute gave rise to this litigation.
Respondentfiledits complaint for declaratory judgment on
November 30, 1981. The case was tried by Judge Collins,
sitting without a jury, on January 21 and January 22, 1982.
At the close of the evidence, he announced his intended ruling, and on March 16, 1982, he filed a judgment (dated Mar.
12, 1982) and hisfindingsof fact and conclusions of law. He
credited Liljeberg's version of oral conversations that were
disputed and of critical importance in his ruling.5
The minutes further reflect the Real Estate Committee's communication to
LiJjeberg that "until a certificate of need were forthcoming, Loyola would
more than likely not be interested in the project/ The minutes outline the
terms of a second offer received by Loyola University from St. Jude Properties raising the purchase price by $7,000.00 per acre, *with no financing
necessary and no commitments of any kind except the dedication of 110 feet
for roadway purposes, with the improvement cost paid totally by the Liljeberg group/ The minutes elaborate on the details of the offer, including
St Jude Properties' desire for a sixty day period to secure financing to
finalize the sale." App. to Pet. for Cert. 19a-20a.
4
Coincidentally, HAI was acquired by Hospital Corporation of America
on August 26, 1981, through a merger of HAI and respondent, Health
Services Acquisition Corporation, which is a subsidiary of Hospital Corporation of America. For convenience, we shall continue to describe this
entity as HAI.
'For example, Liljeberg's attorney testified that before returning the
signed copy of the warranty and indemnity agreement to HAI, he told
HATs associate corporate counsel that Liljeberg would not transfer ownership of St. Jude until they reached a binding agreement concerning Liljeberg's continued participation in the hospital project. HAI's associate corporate counsel testified that no such conversation occurred. App. to Pet.
for Cert 61a, n. 3.
Although noting this conflicting testimony, the Fifth Circuit held on appeal that Judge Collins did not abuse his discretion in awarding the certifi-
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aring the period between November 30,1981, and March
1982, Judge Collins was a trustee of Loyola University,
was not conscious of the fact that the University and
*berg were then engaged in serious negotiations concernhe Kenner hospital project, or of the further fact that the
ess of those negotiations depended upon his conclusion
Liljeberg controlled the certificate of need. To detere whether Judge Collins' impartiality in the Lijjeberg lition "might reasonably be questioned," it is appropriate to
ader the state of his knowledge immediately before the
juit wasfiled,what happened while the case was pending
>re him, and what he did when he learned of the Universiinterest in the litigation.
fter the certificate of need was issued, and Liljeberg and
I became embroiled in their dispute, Liljeberg reopened
negotiations with the University. On October 29, 1981,
Real Estate Committee sent a written report to each of
trustees, including Judge Collins, advising them of "a sigant change" concerning the proposed hospital in Kenner
stating specifically that Loyola's property had "again
>me a prime location." App. 72. The Committee subbed a draft of a resolution authorizing a University vicerident "to continue negotiations with the developers of
St. Jude Hospital." Id., at 73. At the Board meeting
November 12, 1981, which Judge Collins attended, the
Jtees discussed the connection between the rezoning
Loyola's land in Kenner and the St. Jude project and
pted the Real Estate Committee's proposed resolution,
is, Judge Collins had actual knowledge of the University's
ential interest in the St. Jude hospital project in Kenner
: a few days before the complaint was filed.
Vhile the case was pending before Judge Collins, the Unisity agreed to sell 80 acres of its land in Kenner to
ieberg for $6,694,000. The progress of negotiations was
mssed at a Board meeting on January 28, 1982. Judge
lins did not attend that meeting, but the Real Estate
nmittee advised the trustees that "the federal courts have
ermined that the certificate of need will be awarded to the
Jude Corporation." Id., at 37. Presumably this advice
3 based on Judge Collins' comment at the close of the heara week earlier, when he announced his intended ruling
ause he thought "it would be unfair to keep the parties in
ibt as to how I feel about the case." App. to Pet. for
rt. 41a.
[lie formal agreement between Liljeberg and the Univerf was apparently executed on March 19th. App. 50-58.
B agreement stated that it was not in any way conditioned
Liljeberg's prevailing in the litigation "pending in the
S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
. involving the obtaining by [Liljeberg] of a Certificate of
i to Liljeberg. Judge Rubin, in dissent, pointed to another example of
ere Liljeberg received the benefit of the doubt on a critical disputed
t. Lijjeberg's attorney received the proposed warranty and indemnity
•eementfromHAI under cover of a letter which stated:"... I believe
i is the only document. . . that would be needed in effecting the trans." Id., at 60a, n. 2. Liljeberg's attorney testified, however, that he
not read the letter of transmittal. Yet, as Judge Rubin observed:
It is curious that a lawyer would fail to read a letter that comes to him
ached to an important document. It is curiouser, as Alice said, after
> had passed through the looking glass into Wonderland, that Liljeberg,
o repeatedly testified that he distrusted HAI although he had contemned entering into a complex and potentially lucrative relationship with
i corporation, designed to operate over a seven-year period, did not
rpond to the cover letter. . . .
. is curiouser still that [Liljeberg's attorney], who testified that he did
t read the cover letter, nevertheless knew that HAI believed that the
irranty and Indemnity Agreement was sufficient to transfer 'owner-
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Need," id., at 55, but it also gave the University the right to
repurchase the property for the contract price if Liljeberg
had not executed a satisfactory construction contract within
one year and further provided for nullification of the contract
in the event the rezoning of the University's adjoining land
was not accomplished. Thus, the University continued to
have an active interest in the outcome of the litigation because it was unlikely that Liljeberg could build the hospital
if he lost control of the certificate of need; moreover, the rezoning was in turn dependent on the hospital project.6
The details of the transaction were discussed in three letters to the trustees dated March 12, March 15, and March 19,
1982, but Judge Collins did not examine any of those letters
until shortly before the Board meeting on March 25, 1982.
Thus, he acquired actual knowledge of Loyola's interest in
the litigation on March 24, 1982. As the Court of Appeals
correctly held, "Judge Collins should have recused himself
when he obtained actual knowledge of that interest on March
24." 7% F. 2d, at 801.
In considering whether the Court of Appeals properly vacated the declaratory relief judgment, we are required to
address two questions. We must first determine whether
§ 455(a) can be violated based on an appearance of partiality,
even though the judge was not conscious of the circumstances
creating the appearance of impropriety, and second, whether
relief is available under Rule 60(b) when such a violation is
not discovered until after the judgment has become final.
Ill
Title 28 U. S. C. §455 provides in relevant part:7
"(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United
States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which
his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
"(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the fallowing
circumstances:
"(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his
household, has a financial interest in the subject
'As the Court of Appeals pointed out:
T h e district court's determination that Loyola's interest in the litigation
terminated as of March 19,1982 is clearly erroneous. Although the agreement between Loyola and Lujeberg was not contingent on the outcome of
the lawsuit, as a practical matter Loyola still had a substantial interest in
Iceberg's obtaining the certificate of approval. Without the certificate,
it is very likely that Liljeberg would not have been able to build the hospital on the Monroe Tract. The construction of a hospital on its property
was extremely important to Loyola as shown by the fact that Loyola was
allowed under its agreement with Lujeberg to repurchase the land if a hospital was not built. Furthermore, the construction of a hospital on the
Monroe Tract was critical to the effort to rezone the surrounding property
owned by Loyola; the rezoning was also of vital interest to Loyola. Therefore, Loyola's interest in the litigation did not terminate as of March 19,
1962 and Judge Collins should have recused himself when he obtained actual knowledge of that interest on March 24." 796 JF\ 2d, at 800-801.
T
Prior to the 1974 amendments, §455 simply provided:
"Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any
case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has
been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with any party or
his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the
trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein." 62 Stat. 908.
The statute was amended in 1974 to clarify and broaden the grounds for
judicial disqualification and to conform with the recently adopted ABA
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3C (1984). See S. Rep. No. 93-419, p. 1
(1973); H. R. Rep. No. 93-1453, pp. 1-2 (1974). The general language of
subsection (a) was designed to promote public confidence in the integrity
of judicial process by replacing the subjective In his opinion" standard
with an objective test. See S. Rep. No. 93-419, at 5 (1973); H. R. Rep.
No. 93-1453, at 5.
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matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome of the proceeding.
"(c) A judge should inform himself about his personal
andfiduciaryfinancial interests, and make a reasonable
effort to inform himself about the personalfinancialinterests of his spouse and minor children residing in his
household."
Scienter is not an element of a violation of § 455(a). The
judge's lack of knowledge of a disqualifying circumstance may
bear on the question of remedy, but it does not eliminate the
risk that "his impartiality might reasonably be questioned"
by other persons. To read § 455(a) to provide that the judge
must know of the disqualifying facts, requires not simply ignoring the language of the provision—which makes no mention of knowledge—but further requires concluding that the
language in subsection (b)(4)—which expressly provides that
the judge must know of his or her interest—is extraneous.
A careful reading of the respective subsections makes clear
that Congress intended to require knowledge under subsection (b)(4) and not to require knowledge under subsection
(a).' Moreover, advancement of the purpose of the provision—to promote public confidence in the integrity of the
judicial process, see S. Rep. No. 93-419, p. 5 (1973);
H. R. Rep. No. 93-1453, p. 5 (1974)-does not depend upon
whether or not the judge actually knew of facts creating an
appearance of impropriety, so long as the public might reasonably believe that he or she knew. As Chief Judge Clark
of the Court of Appeals explained:
"The goal of section 455(a) is to avoid even the appearance of partiality. If it would appear to a reasonable
person that a judge has knowledge of facts that would
give him an interest in the litigation then an appearance
of partiality is created even though no actual partiality
exists because the judge does not recall the facts, because the judge actually has no interest in the case or because the judge is pure in heart and incorruptible. The
judge's forgetfulness, however, is not the sort of objectively ascertainable fact that can avoid the appearance of
partiality. Hall v. Small Business Administration, 695
F. 2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1983). Under section 455(a),
therefore, recusal is required even when a judge lacks
actual knowledge of the facts indicating his interest or
bias in the case if a reasonable person, knowing all the
circumstances, would expect that the judge would have
actual knowledge." 796 F. 2d, at 802.
'Petitioner contends that 5 455(a) must be construed in light of
% 455(bX4). He argues that the reference to knowledge in § 455(b)(4) indicates that Congress must have intended that scienter be an element under
§ 455(a) as well. Petitioner reasons that 1455(a) is a catchall provision,
encompassing all of the specifically enumerated grounds for disqualification
under § 455(b), as well as other grounds not specified. Not requiring
knowledge under $ 455(a), m petitioner's view, would thus render meaningless the knowledge requirement under §455(bX4). The requirement
could always be circumvented by simply moving for disqualification under
1455(a), rather than § 455(b).
Petitioner's argument ignores important differences between subsections (a) and (bX4). Most importantly, § 455(b)(4) requires disqualification no matter how insubstantial thefinancialinterest and regardless of
whether or not the interest actually creates an appearance of impropriety.
See § 455(d)(4); In re Cement and Concrete Litigation, 515 F. Supp. 1076
(Ariz. 1981), mandamus denied, 688 F. 2d 1297 (CAS 1982), aff'd by the absence of quorum, 459 U. S. 1191 (1983). In addition, § 455(e) specifies that
a judge may not accept a waiver of any ground for disqualification under
1455(b), but may accept such a waiver under § 455(a) after ua full disclosure on the record of the basis for disqualification." Section 455(b) is
therefore a somewhat stricter provision, and thus is not simply redundant
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Contrary to petitioner's contentions, this reading of the
statute does not call upon judges to perform the impossible—
to disqualify themselves based on facts they do not know.
If, as petitioner argues, § 455(a) should only be applied prospectively, then requiring disqualification based on facts the
judge does not know would of course be absurd; a judge could
never be expected to disqualify himself based on some fact he
does not know, even though the fact is one that perhaps he
should know or one that people might reasonably suspect
that he does know. But to the extent the provision can also,
in proper cases, be applied retroactively, the judge is not
called upon to perform an impossible feat. Rather, he is
called upon to rectify an oversight and to take the steps necessary to maintain public confidence in the impartiality of the
judiciary. If he concludes that "his impartiality might reasonably be questioned," then he should alsofindthat the statute has been violated. This is certainly not an impossible
task. No one questions that Judge Collins could have disqualified himself and vacated his judgment when he finally
realized that Loyola had an interest in the litigation. The
initial appeal was takenfromhis failure to disqualify himself
and vacate the judgment after he became aware of the appearance of impropriety, not from his failure to disqualify
himself when he first became involved in the litigation and
lacked the requisite knowledge.
In this case both the District Court and the Court of
Appeals found an ample basis in the record for concluding
that an objective observer would have questioned Judge Collins' impartiality. Accordingly, even though his failure to
disqualify himself was the product of a temporary lapse of
memory, it was nevertheless a plain violation of the terms
of the statute.
A conclusion that a statutory violation occurred does not,
however, end our inquiry. As in other areas of the law,
there is surely room for harmless error committed by busy
judges who inadvertently overlook a disqualifying circumstance.* There need not be a draconian remedy for every
violation of § 455(a). It would be equally wrong, however, to
adopt an absolute prohibition against any relief in cases involving forgetful judges.
IV
Although §455 defines the circumstances that mandate disqualification of federal judges, it neither prescribes nor prohibits any particular remedy for a violation of that duty.
Congress has wisely delegated to the judiciary the task of
fashioning the remedies that will best serve the purpose of
the legislation. In considering whether a remedy is appropriate, we do well to bear in mind that in many cases—and
this is such an example—the Court of Appeals is in a better
position to evaluate the significance of a violation than is this
Court. Its judgment as to the proper remedy should thus be
• Large, multidistrict class actions, for example, often present judges
with unique difficulties in monitoring any potential interest they may have
in the litigation. In such cases, the judge is required to familiarize him or
herself with the named parties and all the members of the class, which in
an extreme case may number in the hundreds or even thousands. This
already difficult task is confounded by the fact that the precise contours of
the class are often not defined until well into the litigation. See Union
Carbide Corp. v. U. S. Cutting Service, Inc., 782 F. 2d 710, 714 (CA7
1986); In re Cement and Concrete Antitrust Litigation, 515 F. Supp., at
1080.
Of course, notwithstanding the size and complexity of the litigation,
judges remain under a duty to stay informed of any personal or fiduciary
financial interest they may have in cases over which they preside. See 28
U. S. C. $ 455(c). The complexity of determining the conflict, however,
may have a bearing on the Rule 60(bX6) extraordinary circumstance
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ed our due consideration. A review of the facts demotes that the Court of Appeals' determination that a
rial is in order is well supported,
tion 455 does not, on its own, authorize the reopening of
I litigation. However, as respondent and the Court of
lis recognized, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)
ies a procedure whereby, in appropriate cases, a party
t>e relieved of a final judgment.10 In particular, Rule
6), upon which respondent relies, grants federal courts
I authority to relieve a party from a final judgment
I such terms as are just," provided that the motion is
within a reasonable time and is not premised on one of
rounds for relief enumerated in clauses (b)(1) through
." The rule does not particularize the factors that
y relief, but we have previously noted that it provides
s with authority "adequate to enable them to vacate
nents whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish
re," Klapprott v. United States, 335 U. S. 601, 614-615
i), while also cautioning that it should only be applied
extraordinary circumstances," Ackermann v. United
», 340 U. S. 193 (1950). Rule 60(b)(6) relief is accordneither categorically available nor categorically unavailfor all § 455 violations. We conclude that in determining
her a judgment should be vacated for a violation of § 455,
ippropriate to consider the risk of injustice to the parties
e particular case, the risk that the denial of relief will
uce injustice in other cases, and the risk of undermining
mblic's confidence in the judicial process. We must con>usly bear in mind that 'to perform its high function in
>est way justice must satisfy the appearance of justice/ "
? Murchison, 349 U. S. 133,136 (1955) (citation omitted).
ke the Court of Appeals, we accept the District Court's
ng that while the case was actually being tried Judge
ederal Rule Civil Procedure 60(b) provides in relevant part:
notion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party
party's legal representative from afinaljudgment, order, or proceed>r the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusneglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could
ave been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
aud . . . , misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;
>r (6) any other reason justifying relieffromthe operation of the judg. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons
2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or prong was entered or taken."
n Klapprott v. United States, 335 U. S. 601,613 (1949), we held that a
f may *iiot avail himself of the broad 'any other reason' clause of 6(Xbr
motion is based on grounds specified in clause (1)—"mistake, inadverB, surprise or excusable neglect." Rather, "extraordinary circum»esn are required to bring the motion within the "other reason" lanne and to prevent clause (6) from being used to circumvent the 1-year
ations period that applies to clause (1). This logic, of course, extends
>nd clause (1) and suggests that clause (6) and clauses (1) through (5)
mutually exclusive. See 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice
Procedure § 2864 (1973). We conclude that the basis for relief in this
is extraordinary and that the motion was thus proper under clause (6).
infra, at
— . Of particular importance, this is not a case ining neglect or lack of due diligence by respondent. Any such neglect
ither chargeable to Judge Collins. Had he informed the parties of his
eiation with Loyola and of Loyola's interest in the litigation on March
1982, when his knowledge of the University's interest was renewed,
xmdent could have raised the issue in a motion for a new trial or on
eal without requiring that the case be reopened. Moreover, even if
xmdent had taken the unusual step of reviewing the Judge's financial
iosure forms—which reveal that he was a member of the Board of
stees—the conflict would not have been brought to its attention. The
diet arose not simplyfromthe Judge's service on the Board of Trustees,
from his service on the Board while the University was involved in its
lings with Liljeberg. This latter fact would not have been made apent through examination of the disclosure reports and, according to
oondent. was not a matter of public record at the time the case was
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Collins did not have actual knowledge of Loyola's interest in
the dispute over the ownership of St. Jude and its precious
certificate of need. When a busy federal judge concentrates
his or her full attention on a pending case, personal concerns
are easily forgotten. The problem, however, is that people
who have not served on the bench are often all too willing
to indulge suspicions and doubts concerning the integrity of
judges." The very purpose of §455(a) is to promote confidence in the judiciary by avoiding even the appearance of impropriety whenever possible. See S. Rep. No 93-419, at 5;
H. R. Rep. No. 93-1453, at 5. Thus, it is critically important in a case of this kind to identify the facts that might reasonably cause an objective observer to question Judge Collins' impartiality. There are at least four such facts.
First, it is remarkable that the judge, who had regularly
attended the meetings of the Board of Trustees since 1977,
completely forgot about the University's interest in having a
hospital constructed on its property in Kenner. The importance of the project to the University is indicated by the fact
that the 80-acre parcel, which represented only about 40%
of the entire tract owned by the University, was sold for
$6,694,000 and that the rezoning would substantially increase
the value of the remaining 60%. The "negotiations with the
developers of the St. Jude Hospital" were the subject of discussion and formal action by the trustees at a meeting attended by Judge Collins only a few days before the lawsuit
was filed. App. 35.
Second, it is an unfortunate coincidence that although the
judge regularly attended the meetings of the Board of Trustees, he was not present at the January 28, 1982, meeting, a
week after the 2-day trial and while the case was still under
advisement. The minutes of that meeting record that representatives of the University monitored the progress of the
trial, but did not see fit to call to the judge's attention the
obvious conflict of interest that resultedfiromhaving a University trustee preside over that trial. These minutes were
mailed to Judge Collins on March 12,1982. If the Judge had
opened that envelope when he received it on March 14th or
15th, he would have been under a duty to recuse himself
before he entered judgment on March 16. *
* As we held in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U. S. 813 (1986), this
concern has constitutional dimensions. In that case we wrote:
"We conclude that Justice Emory's participation in this case violated appellant's due process rights as explicated in Tumey, Murchison, and Word.
We make clear that we are not required to decide whether in fact Justice
Embry was influenced, but only whether sitting on the case then before the
Supreme Court of Alabama4 "would offer a possible temptation to the average [judge]. . . [to] lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true."'
The Due Process Clause inay sometimes bar trial by judges who have no
actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice
equally between contending parties. But to perform its high function in
the best way, justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."'" Id., at
825. (citations omitted).
Afindingby another judge—faced with the the difficult task of passing
upon the integrity of a fellow member of the bench—that his or her colleague merely possessed constructive knowledge, and not actual knowledge, is unlikely to significantly quell the concerns of the skeptic.
"One of the provisions of the contract between Loyola and Liljeberg is
also remarkable. Despite the fact that earlier minutes of the Board make
it clear that the University's interest in serious negotiations with Liljeberg
was conditioned upon the certificate of need, the contract expressly recites
that control of the certificate was the subject of pending litigation and then
provides "that this sale shall not be in any way conditioned upon" the outcome of that litigation. App. 55. The University, however, retained the
right to repurchase the property if Liljeberg was unable to go forward with
the hospital project. If Liljeberg was found not to control the certificate
of need, he, at least arguably, would have been precluded from going forward with the hospital. Moreover, if the parties simply wanted to make
the transaction unconditional, they could have omitted any reference to the
litigation. An objective observer might reasonably question why the par-
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Third, it is remarkable—and quite inexcusable—that
Judge Collins failed to recuse himself on March 24, 1982. A
ftdl disclosure at that time would have completely removed
any basis for questioning the Judge's impartiality and would
have made it possible for a different judge to decide whether
the interests—and appearance—of justice would have been
served by a retrial. Another 2-day evidentiary hearing
would surely have been less burdensome and less embarrassing than the protracted proceedings that resultedfromJudge
Collins' nonrecusal and nondisclosure. Moreover, as the
Court of Appeals correctly noted, Judge Collins' failure to
disqualify himself on March 24, 1982, also constituted a violation of § 455(b)(4), which disqualifies a judge if he "knows
that he, individually or as a fiduciary, . . . has a financial
interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to
the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding." This separate violation of §455 further compels the conclusion that
vacatur was an appropriate remedy; by his silence, Judge
Collins deprived respondent of a basis for making a timely
motion for a new trial and also deprived it of an issue on
direct appeal.14
Fourth, when respondent filed its motion to vacate, Judge
Collins gave three reasons for denying the motion,18 but still
did not acknowledge that he had known about the University's interest both shortly before and shortly after the trial.
Nor did he indicate any awareness of a duty to recuse himself
in March of 1982.
These facts create precisely the kind of appearance of impropriety that § 455(a) was intended to prevent. The violation is neither insubstantial nor excusable. Although Judge
Collins did not know of hisfiduciaryinterest in the litigation,
he certainly should have known. In fact, his failure to stay
informed of thisfiduciaryinterest, may well constitute a separate violation of §455. See § 455(c). Moreover, providing
relief in cases such as this will not produce injustice in other
cases; to the contrary, the Court of Appeals' willingness to
enforce § 455 may prevent a substantive injustice in some future case by encouraging a judge or litigant to more carefully
examine possible grounds for disqualification and to promptly
disclose them when discovered. It is therefore appropriate
to vacate the judgment unless it can be said that respondent
did not make a timely request for relief, or that it would
otherwise be unfair to deprive the prevailing party of its
judgment.
If we focus on fairness to the particular litigants, a careful
study of Judge Rubin's analysis of the merits of the underlying litigation suggests that there is a greater risk of unfairness in upholding the judgment in favor of Liljeberg than
there is in allowing a new judge to take a fresh look at the
"We note that the Court of Appeals affirmed by a divided panel. The
majority opinion relied extensively on the deference due a trial court as to
its findings of fact. Although it is now too late to determine what effect
this additional argument might have had on the decision, it is certainly
within the realm of the possible that the court's decision would have been
swayed.
* These were his three reasons:
"First, Loyola University was not and is not a party to this litigation, nor
was any of its real estate the subject matter of this controversy. Second,
Loyola University is a non-profit, educational institution, and any benefits inuring to that institution would not benefit any individual personally.
Finally, and most significantly, this Judge never served on either the Real
Estate or Executive Committees of the Loyola University Board of Trustees. Thus, this Judge had no participation of any kind in negotiating Loyola University's real estate transactions and, in fact, had no knowledge of
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issues.16 Moreover, neither Liljeberg nor Loyola University
has made a showing of special hardship by reason of their reliance on the original judgment." Finally, although a delay
of 10 months after the affirmance by the Court of Appeals
would normally foreclose relief based on a violation of
§ 465(a), in this case the entire delay is attributable to Judge
Collins* inexcusable failure to disqualify himself on March 24,
1982; had he recused himself on March 24, or even disclosed
Loyola's interest in the case at that time, the motion could
have been made less than 10 days after the entry of judgment. "The guiding consideration is that the administration
of justice should reasonably appear to be disinterested as
well as be so in fact." Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak,
343 U. S. 451, 466-467 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., in chambers).
In sum, we conclude that Chief Judge Clark's opinion of the
Court of Appeals reflects an eminently sound and wise disposition of this case.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly
Affirmed.

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE WHITE
SCALIA join, dissenting.

and JUSTICE

* In an unpublished opinion a majority of the Court of Appeals concluded
that Judge Collins' findings of fact were not clearly erroneous. In dissent,
Judge Rubin expressed the opinion that "Liljeberg's chicanery," id., at
78a, gave rise to an estoppel as a matter of law. He wrote:
"Whether Lujeberg consciously intended to mislead HAI we need not decide. His decision to sign and return the agreement knowing that HAI
believed it to be sufficient to transfer 'ownership' makes it clear that he
was willing to mislead HAI. . . .
"HAI was misled by Lujeberg's silence into doing what it would not otherwise have done: filing the application for a certificate of need. The HAI
witnesses all testified that the company neverfiledan application unless it
wholly controlled the filing corporation; Liljeberg testified that he was
aware of that policy.1" Id., at 76a-77a.
At this point, Judge Rubin inserted the following footnote:
*"That HAI was misled is clear from the face of the application. HAI
there described St. Jude as a Vholly-owned subsidiary.' Indeed, the entire 407-page application is devoted to describing HAI, its hospitals, its
management experience, and its assets. Liljeberg's name appears only in
three letters of intent to file an application for a certificate of need dated
before July, 1980, and on a copy of the Warranty and Indemnity Agreement. HAI also changed the name of St. Jude's registered agent, further
demonstrating its belief that it controlled St. Jude." Id., at 77a, n. 8.
Judge Rubin then continued:
"Therefore, Lujeberg's silence at the time he signed the warranty agreement should estop him from claiming that the agreement, read in conjunction with the HAI cover letter and Douglas' letter enclosing corporate documents, did not transfer control of St. Jude to HAI. However, because
Lujeberg's deception did not end there, the estoppel need not rest on that
alone.
"Liljeberg signed the March 16, 1981 commission agreement which
stated that he was to receive $250,000 (plus interest) only if HAI received
final section 1122 approval. After the certificate of need was issued, Liljeberg requested and received the commission, which, when paid, amounted
to $271,000. In relieving Hospital Corporation of America (HCA), HAI's
successor, of $271,000, Liljeberg never mentioned his contention that
be still 'owned' St. Jude, and that St. Jude, not HAI, had received the
certificate. . . .
"HAI relied on Liljeberg's agreement that it owned St. Jude in buying
the property on which the hospital was to be built. HCA justifiably relied
on Lujeberg's agreement that it owned St. Jude in paying the commission."
Id., at 77a-78a.
n
In fact, Liljeberg's ownership of the certificate of need has never been
entirely settled. On January 31,1983, just two weeks after the Fifth Circuit's judgment affirming Judge Collins on the merits became final, respondent filed suit against St. Jude and various federal and state agencies.
The new action alleges that the certificate was improperly issued in the
name of St. Jude and that respondent is instead entitled to the certificate.
See Health Services Acquisition Corporation v. Guissinger, Civil Action
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g Court's decision in this case is long on ethics in the abt, but short on workable rules of law. The Court first
that 28 U. S. C. §455(a) can be used to disqualify a
> on the basis of facts not known to the judge himself,
en broadens the standard for overturning final judgs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Bethese results are at odds with the intended scope of
and Rule 60(b), and are likely to cause considerable miswhen courts attempt to apply them, I dissent.
I
detailed in the Court's opinion, § 455(a) provides that
y justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall
aHfy himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality
t reasonably be questioned." Section 455 was substanrevised by Congress in 1974 to conform with the rey adopted Canon 3C of the American Bar Association's
of Judicial Conduct (1974). Previously, a federal judge
•equired to recuse himself when he had a substantial int in the proceedings, or when "in his opinion" it was imir for him to hear the case.1 Subsection (a) was drafted
Diace the subjective standard of the old disqualification
Le with an objective test. Congress hoped that this obe standard would promote public confidence in the
tiality of the judicial process by instructing a judge,
confronted with circumstances in which his impartiality
reasonably be doubted, to disqualify himself and allow
er judge to preside over the case.* The amended statso had the effect of removing the so-called "duty to sit,"
i had become an accepted gloss on the existing statute.3
^section (b) of § 455 sets forth more particularized situain which a judge must disqualify himself. Congress ind the provisions of § 455(b) to remove any doubt about
al in cases where a judge's interest is too closely cond with the litigation to allow his participation. Subsecb)(4), for example, disqualifies a jurist if he knows that
s spouse, or his minor children have afinancialinterest
subject matter in controversy. Unlike the more openI provision adopted in subsection (a), the language of
ction (b) requires recusal only in specific circumstances,
> phrased in such a way as to suggest a requirement of
[ knowledge of the disqualifying circumstances.
\ purpose of § 455 is obviously to inform judges of what
rs they must consider in deciding whether to recuse
selves in a given case. The Court here holds, as did the
of Appeals below, that a judge must recuse himself
• § 455(a) if he should have known of the circumstances
-ing disqualification, even though in fact he did not
of them. I do not believe this is a tenable construction
predecessor statute, which had been part of the United States
Mr 60 years, stated:
Interest of justice or judge,
r justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any
which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has
material witness, or is so related to or connected with any party or
>rney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the
ppeal, or other proceeding therein." 28 U. S. C. § 455 (1970 ed.).
H. R. Rep. No. 93-1453, p. 5 (1974). See also Bloom, Judicial
nd Financial Interest as Grounds for Disqualification of Federal
, 35 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 662, 670-676 (1985); Comment, Disqualii of Federal Judges for Bias or Prejudice, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 236,
2 (1978).
He § 455 provides guidance to a judge when he is considering recusiself, 28 U. S. C. § 144 supplies a litigant with the opportunity to file
iavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a perias or prejudice sufficient to mandate disqualification. Respondent

of subsection (a). A judge considering whether or not to recuse himself is necessarily limited to those facts bearing on
the question of which he has knowledge. To hold that disqualification is required by reason of facts which the judge
does not know, even though he should have known of them, is
to posit a conundrum which is not decipherable by ordinary
mortals. While the concept of "constructive knowledge" is
useful in other areas of the law, I do not think it should be
imported into § 455(a).
At the direction of the Court of Appeals, Judge Schwartz
of the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
made factual findings concerning the extent and timing of
Judge Collins* knowledge of Loyola's interest in the underlying lawsuit. See ante, at 2-3. Judge Schwartz determined
that Judge Collins had no actual knowledge of Loyola's involvement when he tried the case. Not until March 24,
1982, when he reviewed materials in preparation for a Board
meeting, did Judge Collins obtain actual knowledge of the negotiations between petitioners and Loyola.
Despite this factual determination, reached after a public
hearing on the subject, the Court nevertheless concludes that
"public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary" compels retroactive disqualification of Judge Collins under
8455(a). This conclusion interprets § 455(a) in a manner
which Congress never intended. As the Court of Appeals
noted, in drafting § 455(a) Congress was concerned with the
"appearance" of impropriety, and to that end changed the
previous subjective standard for disqualification to an objective one; no longer was disqualification to be decided on the
basis of the opinion of the judge in question, but by the standard of what a reasonable person would think. But the facts
and circumstances which this reasonable person would consider must be the facts and circumstances known to the judge
at the time. In short, as is unquestionably the case with
subsection (b), I would adhere to a standard of actual knowledge in § 455(a), and not slide off into the very speculative
ground of "constructive" knowledge.
II
The Court then compounds its error by allowing Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) to be used to set aside a final
judgment in this case. Rule 60(b) authorizes a district court,
on motion and upon such terms as are just, to relieve a party
from afinaljudgment, order, or proceeding for any "reason
justifying relieffromthe operation of the judgment." However, we have repeatedly instructed that only truly "extraordinary circumstances" will permit a party successfully to invoke the "any other reason" clause of § 60(b). See Klapprott
v. United States, 335 U. S. 601, 613 (1949); see also
Ackermann v. United States, 340 U. S. 193, 199 (1950).
This very strict interpretation of Rule 60(b) is essential if the
finality of judgments is to be preserved.
For even if one accepts the Court's proposition that § 455(a)
permits disqualification on the basis of a judge's constructive
knowledge, Rule 60(b)(6) should not be used in this case to
apply § 455(a) retroactively to Judge Collins' participation in
the lawsuit. In the first place, it is beyond cavil that Judge
Collins stood to receive no personalfinancialgain from the
transactions involving petitioner, respondent, and Loyola.
Judge Collins' only prior tie to the dealings was as a member
of Loyola's rather large Board of Trustees and, although
Judge Collins was a member of at least two of the Board's
subcommittees, he had no connection with the Real Estate
subcommittee, the entity responsible for negotiating the sale
of the Monroe Tract. In addition, the motion to set aside the
judgment was made by respondent almost 10 months after
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Rule 60(b)(6) is subject to no absolute time limitation, there
can be no serious argument that the time elapsed since the
entry of judgment must weigh heavily in considering the motion. Finally, and most important, Judge Schwartz determined that Judge Collins did not have actual knowledge of his
conflict of interest during trial and that he made no rulings
after he acquired actual knowledge.4 I thus think it very
unlikely that respondent was subjected to substantial injustice by Judge Collins' failure to recuse himself, and believe
that the majority's use of Rule 60(b)(6) retroactively to set
aside the underlying judgment is therefore unwarranted.
dissenting.
For the reasons given by CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST,
ante, at
, I agree that "constructive knowledge" cannot
be the basis for a violation of 28 U. S. C. § 455(a). The question then remains whether respondent is entitled to a new
trial because there are other "extraordinary circumstances,"
apart from the § 455(a) violation found by the Fifth Circuit,
that justify "relief from operation of the judgment." See
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b)(6); Ackermann v. United States,
340 U. S. 193, 199 (1950), Klapprott v. United States, 335
U. S. 601, 613 (1949). Although the Court collects an impressive array of arguments that might support the granting
of such relief, I believe the issue should be addressed in the
first instance by the courts below. I would therefore remand this case with appropriate instructions.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR,

H BARTOW FARR III, Washington, D C (A J SCHMITT JR ,
MELVIN W MATHES, SCHMITT & MATHES, and ONEK
KLEIN & FARR, on the briefs) for petitioner, WILLIAM M
LUCAS JR , Neu Orleans, La (JOYCE M DOMBOURIAN, LUCAS & ROSEN, CURTIS R BOISFONTAINE, KATHRYN J
LICHTENBERG, and SESSIONS, FISHMAN, ROSENSON,
BOISFONTAINE, NATHAN & WINN, on the briefs) for
respondent

5 6 LV

4645

1942. Under § 702 of the Act, the Commissioner of Immigration and
Naturalization was authorized to designate representatives to receive
petitions, conduct hearings, and grant naturalization outside the United
States In August 1945, the American Vice Consul in Manila was designated pursuant to § 702 to naturalize aliens The Philippine Government, however, expressed its concern that a mass migration of newly
naturalized veterans would dram the soon-to-be independent country's
manpower, and so the naturalization officer's authority was revoked for
a nine-month period between October 1945 and August 1946 Respondents would have been eligible for citizenship under the provisions of the
1940 Act if they had filed naturalization applications before the Act expired on December 31, 1946, but did not do so More than 30 years
later, they petitioned for naturalization, claiming that the nine-month absence of a 5 702 naturalization officer violated the 1940 Act and deprived
them of rights secured by the Fifth Amendment The naturalization examiner, in all of the cases consolidated here, recommended against naturalization, and the District Courts rejected the naturalization petitions
On respondents' appeals (some of which were consolidated), heard in two
cases by different Ninth Circuit panels, the Court of Appeals ultimately
held that the revocation of the Vice Consul's naturalization authority
violated what it characterized as the 1940 Act's mandatory language,
and that the naturalization of respondents was an appropriate equitable
remedy
Held.
1. Neither by application of the doctrine of estoppel, nor by invocation
of equitable powers, nor by any other means does a court have the power
to confer citizenship in violation of the limitations imposed by Congress
in the exercise of its exclusive constitutional authority over naturalization. Since respondents have no current statutory right to citizenship
under the expired provisions of the 1940 Act, the Nmth Circuit lacked
authority to grant the petitions for naturalization The reasoning of
INS v. Hibi, 414 U S 5—which held that the same official acts as those
alleged here did not give rise to an estoppel that prevented the Governmentfrominvoking the December 31,1946, cutoff date m the 1940 Act —
suggests the same result as to the "equitable remedy" theory in this
case Even assuming that, in reviewing naturalization petitions, federal
courts sit as courts of equity, such courts can no more disregard statutory provisions than can courts of law Congress has given the power to
the federal courts to make someone a citizen as a specific function to be
performed in strict compliance with the terms of 8 U S C § 1421(d),
which states that a person may be naturalized "in the manner and
under the conditions prescribed in this subchapter, and not otherwise "
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The majority's opinion suggests a number of troubling hypothetical
situations, only one of which will demonstrate the difficulties inherent in its
decision Suppose Judge Doe sits on a bench trial involving X Corp andY
Corp. The judge rules for X Corp , and judgment is affirmed on appeal
Ten years later, officials at Y Corp learn that, unbeknownst to him, Judge
Doe owned several shares of stock in X Corp Even in the face of an independent factual finding that Judge Doe had no knowledge of this ownership, the Court's construction of 5 455(a) and Rule 60(b) would permit the
final judgment in X Corp 's favor to be set aside if the "appearance of
impartiality" were not deemed wholly satisfied Such a result will adversely affect the reliance placed onfinaljudgments and will inhibit developments premised on their finality
•Together with No 86-2019, Immigration and Naturalization Service

2. Assuming that respondents can properly mvoke the Constitution's
protections, and granting that they had statutory entitlements to naturalization, there is no merit to their contention that the revocation of the
Vice Consul's naturalization authority deprived them of their rights
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and under its
equal protection component Respondents were not entitled to individualized notice of any statutory rights and to the continuous presence of a
naturalization officer in the Philippines from October 1945 until July
1946 Moreover, the historical record does not support the contention
that the actions at issue here were motivated by any racial animus
8. There is no merit to the separate arguments of respondents
Litonjua and Manzano, including the argument that the Government did
not introduce any evidence in their cases concerning the historical events
at issue It is well settled that the bujxlen is on the alien applicant to
establish his eligibility for citizenship
796 F 2d 1091, reversed
SCALIA, J , delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST,
C. J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ ,

joined BLACKMUN, J , concurred in the result
part in the consideration or decision of the case

KENNEDY, J , took no

delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondents, 16 Filipino nationals who served with the
United States Armed Forces during World War II, claim
they are entitled to apply for and receive American citizenship under a special immigration statute that expired over 40
years ago, §§701 to 705 of the Nationality Act of 1940, Pub.
L. No. 76-853, 54 Stat. 1137, as amended by the Second War
Powers Act of 1942, § 1001, Pub. L. 77-507, 56 Stat. 182,
o TT c r ainni noan *H q„nn V) H940 Act). In the
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